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Vijñānabhikṣu’s Approach to the Īśvara
Concept in Patañjali’s Yogasūtras
T. S. Rukmani
Concordia University
PATAÑJALI discusses Iśvara, the paramapuruṣa, as he calls Īśvara, in sūtras 23-29 of the
first pāda (chapter) called the samādhipāda of
the Yogasūtras (YS). The description of Iśvara
in these sūtras makes it difficult to classify
Īśvara in a purely theistic mode. In these seven
sūtras one can see shades of theism as well as
non-theistic ideas. Since I am dealing with
Vijñānabhikṣu’s take on Īśvara in Patañjali’s YS
I shall first concentrate on the first two sūtras
i.e I. 23 and 24 dealing with Iśvara before
examining the others in the first and second
pādas (chapters) where we get some more sūtras
dealing with Īśvara.
In sūtra I.23 Patañjali mentions that samādhi
can be attained by praṇidhāna on Īśvara. In this
context we do not know whether Patañjali
views Īśvara as of a theistic nature or just a
concept. For that we need to study the word
“Īśvara-praṇidhāna” closely, as the operative
word in this sutra is ‘praṇidhāna’.
Different commentators have understood
the word ‘praṇidhāna’ differently, and we will
look at Vyāsa (ca 5th century CE), Vācaspati
Miśra (ca 9th century CE), Bhoja (ca 11th century
CE) and Vijñānabhikṣu (16th century CE) to see
how they interpret praṇidhāna. Vyāsa is
important, as he is the first extant
commentator on the YS who sets the trends for
other commentators to follow. He defines
praṇidhāna as ‘bhakti-viśeṣa’ (a special kind of
devotion). Special devotion stands for total
devotion to the Īśvara concept used as a

support for meditation and can denote a kind
of abstract concentration on a concept. One
may wonder whether one can have “total
devotion” to a concept. The history of
development of the concept of a higher or
absolute “Truth” starting with the Rgveda has
accommodated an abstract notion of the
absolute in such statements as “Truth is One, It
can be described variously”. We also find this
“absolute” defined as devoid of any gender as
early as the Upaniṣads. Thus the Svetāśvatara
Upaniṣad says “This One is surely not a woman,
nor is this one a man, and this one is certainly
not a eunuch. It is protected by those very
bodies whichever it takes up” (5.10). This is in
keeping with the Vedic holistic idea of
everything in the universe being a form of the
ultimate Brahman. Even though this is
difficult to comprehend in the Abrahamic
religions it is possible to meditate or be devoted
to a concept of the highest Truth or Īśvara in
the Vedic tradition.
Vyāsa, while parsing the word ‘bhaktiviśeṣa’, changes the discourse by inserting the
two words ‘favours’ (anugr̥ḥṇāti) and overcome
(āvarjitaḥ) while commenting on this sūtra.
These two words bring in an agency to Īśvara
who exercises his desire to favour the devotee
overcome by the yogis’ total devotion. ‘Favour’
and ‘being overcome’ also introduce a sense of
duality which does not seem to be Patañjali’s
idea. Vācaspati Miśra, who comes after Vyāsa,
takes the cue from Vyāsa and again mentions
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Īśvara’s favour to the yogin by allowing him to
have his desired goal (idam asya abhimatam astu
iti) i.e. samādhi through abhidhyāna. But from
Bhoja’s Rājamārtāṇḍa commentary which is on
Patañjali’s YS themselves and does not depend
on Vyāsa’s commentary as such, we understand
that praṇidhāna is dedicating all one’s actions to
Parameśvara with total detachment towards
pleasure or pain which will then result in quick
samādhi. This is the Gītā idea of karma-yoga, and
there is no sense of any theistic God
intervention to bestow samādhi on the yogin.
Karma-yoga by itself will result in the desired
effect, i.e. samādhi, according to Bhoja. But one
senses that the whole trend in these
commentaries seems to have changed
Patañjali’s approach to Īśvara. There is no
indication of a theistic dimension in any of the
places that Īśvara occurs, as far as Patañjali is
concerned. I shall deal with Bhikṣu’s
interpretation of ‘praṇidhāna’ a little later, as
this paper is specifically on Bhikṣu’s
understanding of Īśvara in the YS.
Having introduced Īśvara and praṇidhāna in
sūtra I.23 the next sūtra I.24 defines the nature
of Īśvara further. Herein the basic nature of
Īśvara is mentioned as “not being subject to the
bondages that puruṣas in bondage are subject to
before they are liberated, i.e the bondage of
ignorance”. So the argument goes that Īśvara is
always liberated and always free (sadaiva
muktaḥ sadaiva īśvara iti).
Let us examine that argument closely.
Īśvara is mentioned as untainted by kleśas or
afflictions and as someone who has no karma
(actions), vipāka (result of action) and āśaya
(deposits of karma). But here there is a
paradox. While Īśvara alone is mentioned as
untainted by kleśas we must remember that, in
truth, none of the individual puruṣas is tainted
by kleśas. Kleśas are in the mind, and puruṣa is
only an experiencer by proxy. And experience
itself is only a reflection of puruṣa on to buddhi
(citta) in Yoga; therefore one cannot attribute
experience in truth to the individual puruṣa. So
we find that none of the puruṣas is really
tainted by the afflictions. Then how does Īśvara
differ from the individual puruṣas? The answers
provided by commentators do not satisfactorily
explain this riddle.
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Continuing with sūtra I.24, in answer to the
question whether there is proof for Īśvara’s
eternal freedom and excellence (aiśvarya),
Vyāsa introduces the idea that the excellence
of Īśvara is due to pure sattva which has its
basis in the śāstra. In other words śāstra
declares that Īśvara has pure sattva (śuddhasattva), and pure sattva has its basis in śāstra;
rather a circular argument. But where did pure
sattva suddenly crop up? Patañjali does not at
any stage mention a category of ‘pure sattva’ in
his sūtras. It thus seems that pure satttva has
been introduced by Vyāsa in order to
distinguish Īśvara from the puruṣas since, as
pointed out above, the freedom from afflictions
etc., to distinguish Īśvara from the puruṣas is
rather a weak argument. To the credit of Vyāsa
we have to add that after that description of
Īśvara in I.24 Vyāsa let him be and does not in
any way consider Īśvara as having a role in the
manifestation of the universe etc., as would be
done by Bhikṣu later. In that sense Vyāsa is
truthful to the sūtra text and honours its
metaphysics of prakr̥ti alone having a causal
role in the manifestation of the world.
Now let us see how Bhikṣu approaches the
‘praṇidhāna’ question in I.23. Bhikṣu explains
the word praṇidhāna as the ‘samādhi that causes
‘asaṃprajñata samādhi’ and is a ‘special kind of
abstract thought’ (bhāvanāviśeṣa eva ). He also
adds that the -abstract thought is on the ātman
(ātmapraṇidhānasya atra laksanīyatvāt) which
then rules out duality and an Īśvara which is
outside of oneself. But that is not all.
Continuing the discussion Bhikṣu seems to
draw a distinction between the individual
puruṣa and the parama- puruṣa and seems to
suggest that practicing yoga in general will lead
to prajñā or insight much slower than when
practicing concentration on Īśvara which will
achieve asaṃprajñatasamādhi faster. While so
far there is no sense of an Īśvara outside of
oneself, soon after, Bhikṣu introduces the idea
that Īśvara favours the yogin by desiring his
liberation to come soon (yogiinām āsannatamau
samādhimokṣau bhavata ityarthaḥ). So we have
no clear cut idea as to what Bhikṣu wants us to
understand is his idea of Īśvara. For that we
need to go to the other places in the YS where
the Īśvara concept occurs and how Bhikṣu
approaches the Īśvara concept.
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Let us look at the other sūtras in the first
pāda to see if there is any further guidance to
understand Īśvara. Sutra I.25 just mentions that
in Īśvara there is unexcelled Omniscience.
Commenting on this Bhikṣu again mentions
Īśvara blessing the devotees with the hope that
“I shall uplift my devotees through teachings
on knowledge and dharma” (tasyeśvarasya
svopakārābhāve’pi bhaktān puruṣānuddhariṣyāmi
ityāśayena
jñānadharmayorupadeśato
bhaktabhūtānugrahaḥ prayojanam). This further
leads to an opponent mentioning that Īśvara is
partial to his devotees and is thus not impartial
as Īśvara only uplifts his devotees. Using the
example of fire, Bhikṣu denies that accusation
and says that just as fire has the nature of heat
so also the nature of ‘pure sattva’ is to come
under the influence of one’s devotees. He
further says that “partiality comes only
through attachment and hatred and not by
action alone” (vaiṣamyam ca rāgadveṣābhyāmeva
bhavati na tu pravr̥ttimātreṇa iti). He also uses the
karma theory like the Brahmasūtra to explain
the good and the bad that occurs to humans
and devas alike. And then says that the results
are given because of Īśvara’s attachment to the
devotee (bhaktapāravaśyanimittakam iti). It
seems that Bhikṣu wants to retain the idea of
‘attachment’ of Īśvara to his devotees and also
depend on the actions of humans themselves
for the results of ‘pleasure’ or ‘pain’. There is no
clear cut statement as to the nature of Īśvara in
this sūtra as well, and it is ‘pure sattva’ that is
brought in to explain the attachment.
Sutra I.26 mentions Īśvara as being
unconditioned by time and being the guru of
all those who went before (pūrveśām api).
Bhikṣu explains that Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva and
others (the functional deities) came into being
because of Īśvara and also adds that Īśvara is
the efficient cause of the world. In other words
having brought in Brahma, Viṣṇu and Śiva in
the context of the evolution of the universe
Bhikṣu could not compromise the Yoga position
of prakr̥ti being the material cause in the
evolution of the cosmos. Since he also has to
maintain the position of Iśvara as the guru of
Brahmā and so on he assigns Īśvara the
efficiency to bring the world into existence
which has already been introduced in sūtra I.24.
He also introduces the idea of the relationship
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of the jīvas to Īśvara as that between the fire
and its sparks i.e. a difference-nondifference
relationship which Bhikṣu calls avibhāga (nonseparate).
Sutras I.26 and 27 talk about the connection
of Om denoting Īśvara and how through the
repetition of Om the yogī’s mind can attain
one-pointedness (ekāgratā). In his commentary
Bhikṣu designates Om as the ‘mantra’ limb
(aṅga) of praṇidhāna (pranidhānāṅgam mantram)
and also equates Īśvara with Brahman. Thus he
says that “Praṇidhāna is meditating on
Brahman along with repetition of the word
‘Om’ and that should be done knowing the
relationship between the word and its
meaning” (praṇavajapena saha brahmadhyānam
praṇidhānam, tacca vācyavācakabhāvam jñātvā
kartavyam). Bhikṣu thus lays down his
philosophy of ‘avibhāga’ in this context which is
his form of “advaita-Vedānta”. It is not an
identity with Brahman as in Śaṅkara’s advaita
but somewhat like Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita
though explained differently by Bhiksu. (For
details Rukmani on Vijñānabhikṣu: The
Sāṃkhya-Yoga-Vedāntācārya,
2010
ICPR
Journal)’. So Bhikṣu’s Yoga Īśvara is the
Vedānta Brahman as well as ātman in a
relationship of avibhāga. But that is not what
Patañjali and even Vyāsa believes to be the YS
Īśvara.
There are at least four more sūtras where
the Īśvara concept occurs, i.e YS II. 1,32, 44 and
45. In II.1 Īśvara-praṇidhāna is mentioned as
part of niyama the second of the eightfold
means to Yoga. One needs to recall in this
context that, according to Vyāsa and all later
commentators, the first pāda (Samādhipāda) is
meant for the uttama-adhikārin (best aspirant)
whereas the second pāda (Sādhanapāda) is
meant for the one who has started on the path
of yoga i.e. a madhyama-adhikārin (middling
aspirant). Thus Bhikṣu states that in the first
pāda
the
person
addressed
was
a
samāhitacittasya/yogārūdhacittasya
i.e.
one
whose mind has already climbed the path of
yoga, the best aspirant) who needs only abhyāsa
and vairāgya (repeated practice of yoga and
detachment) for attaining asaṃprajñāta.
Therefore Īśvarapraṇidhāna was interpreted
differently in the first pāda from how it needs
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to be understood in the second pāda, which is
meant for a middling aspirant.
In the second pāda Bhikṣu’s understanding
of Īśvara-praṇidhāna is similar to that of Bhoja,
i.e. dedication of all one’s deeds to Īśvara,
which is the Gītā idea of karma-yoga. The logic
for this, according to Bhikṣu, is that in the first
pāda devotion is the form of bhāvanā (abstract
thought) which is only knowledge (jñānameva)
and has no residue of karma (deeds). Whereas
he goes on to add that in the second pāda, there
will be residue of deeds when done with a sense
of agency, and so its dedication to Īśvara makes
sense for the middling (madhyama) aspirant. In
one place Bhikṣu calls Īśvara the ‘inner self’
(antaryāmin); thus he says “the offering of all
worldly and sacrificial deeds to Parameśvara,
i.e the inner self” (laukikavaidika asādhāraṇyena
sarvakarmaṇām parameśvare antaryāminyarpaṇam
ityarthaḥ). He goes on to say that “the thought
that Īśvara is the enjoyer of the fruits is the
renunciation of the fruits of deeds”. The
emphasis is on the abandonment of the sense of
agency and not so much on the identity of who
this Parameśvara is. As if to emphasize that
idea he quotes from the Kūrma Purāṇa soon
after and indicates that the Īśvara here is
Brahman (brahmaṇā dīyate deyam brahmaṇe
saṃpradīyate,
brahmaiva
dīyate
ceti
brahmārpaṇamidam
param;
nāham
kartā
sarvametat brahmaiva kurute tathā, etad
brahmārpaṇam proktam r̥ṣibhistattvadarśibhiḥ).
He reinforces the idea of Brahman further,
quoting from the Kūrma Purāṇa, that this
dedication of the fruits of deeds to Parameśvara
is
the
best
offering
to
Brahman
(karmaṇāmetadapyāhur
brahmārpaṇam
anuttamam). So here again there is no clear cut
idea of Īśvara/Parameśvara being a theistic
representation. It is the Upaniṣadic idea of a
concept that is prominent here as well. It seems
the purpose is to remove the sense of ‘ego’ or
agency from the mind of the one who acts as
that is the prime object of Yoga, and the person
the deeds are dedicated to is of secondary
significance.
The next sūtra in which Īśvara-praṇidhāna
occurs is YS II.32 where Bhikṣu once again
sticks to the meaning of dedicating all one’s
actions to the greatest guru (paramagurau
sarvakarmārpaṇam). Patañjali has introduced
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the term guru in place of Īśvara earlier in the
first pāda (I.26), and both Vyāsa and Bhikṣu call
Iśvara the ‘greatest guru’ in II.32.
This
substitution of paramaguru for Īśvara somehow
conveys the sense that it is the dedication of
fruits of deeds that is of importance and not
whom it is dedicated to. Bhikṣu seems to
support that when he says “Here the object of
thought is, mainly, only the dedication of all
action and not the essence of Īśvara”
(sarvakarmārpaṇam eva mukhyato dhyeyam na
tvīśvaratattvam). Bhikṣu adds significantly that
“In general Īśvara is to be thought of (in this
context) by attributing agency to it and as only
being its attribute. Therefore its being an
external limb of yoga is appropriate” (»śvarastu
sāmānyastadviśeṣaṇatāmātreṇa kartr̥tvāropeṇa ca
dhyeya ityato yuktā tasya yogabahiraṅgatā iti). In
other words for purposes of dedication of deeds
Iśvara is just a concept having agency
attributed to it (kartr̥tvāropeṇa). This has
support from Vyāsa as he also adds that from
the dedication of deeds to Īśvara there arises
realization of the inner self (not a theistic
Iśvara)
and
absence
of
obstacles
(pratyakcetanādigamaḥ and antarāyābhāvaśca).
As far as Bhikṣu is concerned everything
falls into place if one is conscious that all along
Bhiksu is trying to promote his concept of
Īśvara which is Brahman in his
avibhāgaadvaita. Though not a theistic Brahman,
Bhiksu’s Īśvara is someone who can exercise his
grace (anugraha) and bless his devotees due to
the ‘pure sattva’ which is Īśvara’s adjunct. As
Bhikṣu is also a yogī par excellence he retains
asaṃprajñāta-yoga as the means to the
realization of Brahman/Īśvara and not jñāna
(knowledge) or bhakti (devotion). All this is
explained better in his Vijñānāmr̥tabhāsya,
which is his commentary on the Brahmasūtra.
As the main theme of this Journal is to
compare the Yoga Īśvara with the Christian
God, we need to further ask ourselves whether
Patañjali’s Īśvara has any role to play in the
creation of the universe similar to God in
Christianity. As far as Patañjali’s YS is
concerned Īśvara does not have any visible role
in the evolution of the world. As I have written
elsewhere it seems that prakr̥ti serves as both
the material and efficient cause for the
evolution of the world in Patañjali’s YS (see
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Adyar Library
Bulletin, Vol. 65, 2001, pp. 57-71). However,
quoting from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa Bhikṣu says that
“Hari by entering through his own desire both
prakr̥ti and puruṣa at the time of evolution
(sarga) disturbs both prakr̥ti and puruṣa”. One
needs to note that in Yoga only the equilibrium
of prakr̥ti is disturbed and puruṣa is not subject
to any change. Ignoring that part of the Viṣṇu
Purāṇa’s statement Bhikṣu maintains that Yoga
distinction and makes Īśvara serve the purpose
of bringing together the insentient prakr̥ti into
contact with the sentient puruṣa for disturbing
the
equilibrium
of
the
guṇas
(parameśvaraprayatnenaiva
guṇavaiśamyam
śrūyate).
The introduction of Īśvara by Bhikṣu for the
purposes of evolution of the world smacks very
much like Nyāya, which brings in its own Iśvara
to connect karma with humans for future
births. Nyāya’s logic is that there needs to be a
sentient Īśvara to connect the insentient karma
with the appropriate body complex. Bhikṣu’s
reasons also share some of this logic. But he
does not use the argument of karma being
insentient, and therefore the necessity of a
sentient puruṣa to accomplish the task of
connecting an individual to his/her karma in a
future birth. For Bhikṣu the desire of
Hari/Īśvara is sufficient explanation for that to
occur. Bhikṣu in the process has to go through a
tortuous explanation of what happens to Īśvara
and his desire/knowledge at the time of pralaya
(dissolution of the world) in order to be
consistent in his theory. Attributing desire and
effort (prayatna) to Īśvara brings in a theistic
dimension as well.
While in Sāṃkhya the absence of Iśvara
necessitates the coming together of puruṣa and
prakr̥ti for evolution problematic due to both
being permanent entities, Bhikṣu uses the
presence of Īśvara in Yoga for bringing them
together. However, in the process he goes
against the grain of the YS themselves. In YS
IV.2-3 Patañjali and Vyāsa both clarify that the
evolution of the world including humans
happens because of a filling in process (āpūreṇa)
by prakr̥ti when obstacles in the form of dharma
and adharma are removed. It is much like the
removing of obstacles between fields to enable
water to flow from one field to another. Īśvara
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does not figure anywhere here and Bhikṣu
violates that basic principle of Yoga
philosophy.
One must add that, though Bhiksu’s Īśvara
has this efficient role in the evolution of the
world, he does not create anything ex nihilo
including that of human beings. Their coming
into being is determined by the momentum of
their own karma which is present even at the
time of pralaya in their respective subtle bodies.
Even Bhikṣu cannot change that fundamental
principle of Hindu philosophy.
Let us now ask the question of the role that
Bhikṣu’s Īśvara has in the granting of mokṣa
through grace to his devotees, somewhat as in
Christianity. Everything said and done Bhikṣu is
first and foremost a yogin as mentioned earlier,
and is not willing to go too far to accommodate
his theistic leanings. Thus Bhikṣu cannot bring
in Īśvara’s grace for kaivalya purposes, as it will
be in violation of the basic YS assumption. Even
though
Vyāsa
introduced
the
word
“anugraha/anugr̥ḥṇāti’ in his commentary on
sūtra I.23 all commentators including Bhikṣu
only concede that it can only speed up the
process of Samādhi and nothing more. It has
something to do with the ¹laṃbana/support
itself transforming the individual and has
nothing to do with Īśvara’s grace. The
meditative
process
used
here
is
Īśvarapraṇidhāna and not anugraha or ānukūlya
etc. The most that even Bhikṣu can say about
Īśvara in the context of the goal of Yoga is that
meditation on Īśvara can achieve samādhi
quicker. Moreover since puruṣa-viśeṣa (Īśvara)
is also defined as being pure consciousness with
pure sattva undiluted by rajas and tamas one
cannot imagine any act of grace from pure
consciousness as such. Liberation, the ultimate
goal, is also not going to heaven or hell after
waiting in limbo for some time. Bhikṣu tries to
incorporate realization of Īśvara into his mokṣa
concept as an extra goal apart from separation
of one’s own self from prakr̥ti, i.e. kaivalya, but
he has not worked that out carefully. If Īśvara is
only pure consciousness and puruṣas are also so
many pure consciousnesses what is it that one
is becoming other than a śuddha- puruṣa, which
is only consciousness? So where does Īśvara fit
into this scheme of liberation?
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The introduction of Īśvara in Patajñjali’s YS
is not very robust. It is only one of the
alternative supports which can help in the
progress to samādhi albeit more quickly than
some of the other alternatives. There is no help
as to why this should be quicker than the other
supports.
The more I read Bhikṣu the more I feel that
he has tried to fit in Brahman as Īśvara as
interpreted
in
his
avibhāga-advaita
interpretation of the Brahmasūtras into the
Yoga framework. He uses Īśvara to disturb the
equilibrium of the guṇas in prakr̥ti and start the
evolution process. His Īśvara is certainly not
cast in a theistic frame. It can perhaps fit into a
deistic frame of thinking. Īśvara again surfaces
in the context of explaining kaivalya for Bhikṣu
alone and not for the other commentators.
Bhikṣu lived in the period when bhakti and
a theistic way of depicting the divine was at his
height. Even an advaita scholar like
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who lived in the same
period, accommodates a bhakti streak within his
advaita leanings, pointing to the strong
influence that theistic bhakti tendencies had in
the milieu when Bhikṣu lived.
In the above study what one notices is that
the continuing commentarial literature on
philosophical texts (which is true of other
genres as well) throws light on the way
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commentators tend to interpret old texts in
keeping with their own historical and
sociological contexts. This is in keeping with
the belief that commentators are hermeneuts
in the Indian knowledge systems. Since this
study is especially on the concept of Īśvara, in a
global context, it also enables one to compare
the same idea available in the other religious
traditions as well.
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